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Abstract—The robot market has been growing significantly
and is expected to become 1.5 times larger in 2024 than
what it was in 2019. Robots have attracted attention of
security companies thanks to their mobility. These days, for
security robots, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have quickly
emerged by highlighting their advantage: they can even go to
any hazardous place that humans cannot access. For UAVs,
Drone has been a representative model and has several merits
to consist of various sensors such as high-resolution cameras.
Therefore, Drone is the most suitable as a mobile surveillance
robot. These attractive advantages such as high-resolution
cameras and mobility can be a double-edged sword, i.e.,
privacy infringement. Surveillance drones take videos with
high-resolution to fulfill their role, however, those contain
a lot of privacy sensitive information. The indiscriminate
shooting is a critical issue for those who are very reluctant
to be exposed. To tackle the privacy infringement, this
work proposes face-anonymizing drone patrol system. In
this system, one person’s face in a video is transformed
into a different face with facial components maintained. To
construct our privacy-preserving system, we have adopted the
latest generative adversarial networks frameworks and have
some modifications on losses of those frameworks. Our face-
anonymzing approach is evaluated with various public face-
image and video dataset. Moreover, our system is evaluated
with a customized drone consisting of a high-resolution cam-
era, a companion computer, and a drone control computer.
Finally, we confirm that our system can protect privacy
sensitive information with our face-anonymzing algorithm
while preserving the performance of robot perception, i.e.,
simultaneous localization and mapping.
Index Terms—Privacy infringement, privacy-preserving vi-
sion, deep learning, security robot, drone patrol system
I. INTRODUCTION
The security robot market is expected to grow from USD
2.106 billion in 2019 to USD 3.33 billion by 2024 [1].
As mobile surveillance devices, security robots are slowly
being deployed in several common sights such as malls,
offices, and public spaces. Since mobile surveillance de-
vices consist of artificial intelligence, cameras, and storage,
they can more reliably collect data than human, suggesting
the security robots can effectively replace human security
guards.
For security robots, there are several robot types: un-
manned ground vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles. Es-
pecially, the unmanned aerial vehicles attract the attention
as security patrol robots since those can move anywhere
more freely than the unmanned ground vehicles.
Recently, Drone has been emerging in unmanned aerial
vehicles. The drone market is expected to reach USD
129.23 billion by 2025 [2]. Thanks to the capability to
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go any place that humans and ground vehicles cannot
reach, Drone rapidly has been taking the place of the
conventional surveillance methods such as fixed CCTV and
human guards [3]. In addition, since Drone can consist
of high-computing onboard computer, cameras, and sev-
eral sensors, those have considerable potential to increase
surveillance by adopting high-quality image processing.
However, security patrol robots incur several issues such
as privacy infringement as well as malfunction. Since
Drone can go anywhere with high-resolution cameras, it
potentially has a damaging threat to privacy. The rep-
resentative UAV takes videos in public spaces with a
high-resolution camera to fulfill their role, and then the
indiscriminate shooting is a crucial problem for people
who are disinclined to be exposed and highly regard their
privacy. A drone indeed can be used to infringe a person’s
privacy with a camera spying on a person [4]. In 2015,
a Kentucky man shot down a drone hovering over his
property [5], [6]. He argued that the drone was spying
on his 16-year-old daughter who was sunbathing in the
garden. In addition, an article reported that a Knightscope
security robot was suspended from its job of patrolling a
San Francisco animal shelter after some residents felt the
robot was taking unnecessary photos of them [7].
Due to robot cameras, human privacy infringement is-
sues could become a critical but pervasive social problem
[8]. Hence, a clever solution should be developed to
preserve the person’s privacy, but require no sacrifice of
robot perception performance. Several works have pro-
posed some methods to protect the privacy invasion [9]–
[11]. Those schemes detect privacy-sensitive information
from images, and then remove or anonymize it via machine
learning techniques.
This work proposes a privacy-preserving drone pa-
trol system with face-anonymizing networks. In our face
anonymizing framework, the key idea is to modify one face
in a video frame to look like it is not his/her face. In our
system, the face-anonymizing framework is implemented
on a companion computer which is loaded on a drone.
Hence, video frames recorded by a drone’s camera are
immediately processed on the companion computer by
our face-anonymizing networks, and then the results will
be transmitted via a wireless technology. Specifically, the
contribution of this work is summarized as follows.
• We propose our face-anonymizing approach, where a
face image is transformed to an intermediate image by
removing the privacy-sensitive information, and then
the intermediate image is converted to a photorealistic
face image.
• To realize our approach, this work presents a training
architecture to combine two latest generative adver-
2sarial networks (GANs). Then, we explain challenges
to train deep learning networks for our system pur-
pose. Finally, it is introduced how to overcome the
challenges. Note that our proposed modifications’
approach is not limited to the adopted training frame-
works, but can be utilized in any other GAN frame-
works for anonymizing purpose.
• Via various face image and video dataset, we conduct
extensive evaluation to verify our face-anonymizing
framework. The results confirm that our proposed
scheme anonymizes faces in various images and
videos well enough.
• We build a drone consisting of a zed camera and a
companion computer to demonstrate our drone patrol
system. Our face-anonymizing framework is loaded on
the companion computer. We utilize robot operating
system (ROS) framework to connect each component
in our system. Via a real video recorded by a drone’s
camera, we present how our system will actually work
in reality.
A. Related Work
1) Removal of Privacy Sensitive Information: In robot
cameras, the privacy infringement has attracted attention to
develop a method removing the privacy-sensitive informa-
tion in images [9]–[11].
In [9], the authors introduced scene recognition from
a image. The scheme determines if a person is in a
privacy-sensitive location. If a image is taken in a privacy-
sensitive place, the proposal allows a camera device to be
automatically turned off. However, faces are still exposed
in privacy-insensitive places, and thus this scheme is not
suitable for patrol drone visions.
Jason et al. [10] developed the privacy preserving ac-
tion detection via a face modifier by using Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs). They proposed pixel-level
modifications to change each person’s face with minimal
effect on action recognition performance. The proposed
generator modifies each pixel in a original face to remove
features of the face. To train the generator, the authors
design their discriminator based on a face identification
network that recognizes who s/he is. The generator learns
the way to make the discriminator believe that a generated
face is different from the original image. However, the
generator tends to replace a input face to another face in
the training dataset. In other words, the problem is that the
generator doesn’t learn how to change a face not in the
training dataset. Moreover, the generator observes pixels
of a face for modification, which means that a modified
face is generated based on the original face. This approach
could still leave some information of a original face in a
modified face.
The work [11] proposed a dynamic resolution face
detection architecture to blur faces. The framework detects
faces from extreme low resolution images via the proposed
deep learning-based algorithm. Except for the detected
faces, other privacy-insensitive pixels are enhanced to high
resolution. Hence, in result images, only faces are blurred,
which protects privacy-sensitive parts while preserving the
performance of robot perception. However, in the case that
a face are big in a frame, an intimate person can recognize
who the person is in the frame even if the face is blurred. In
addition, it would be possible not to detect a face in a low-
resolution image, and then this scheme couldn’t protect a
person’s privacy.
2) Generative Adversarial Networks: Generative Adver-
sarial Networks (GANs) have had impressive success in
generating realistic images [12]. The goal of this learning
framework is to train a neural network to model a image
distribution in an unsupervised manner. The trained net-
work can generate a fake image indistinguishable from a
real image. This training approach have been adopted to
image-to-image translation [13]–[21]. Those works learn
a mapping from input to output images, meaning that
a input image is translated to a image in a different
image distribution. To construct our training architecture
for obtaining deep-learning networks for our purpose, we
have adopted the latest two works [19], [21]. By using
the training framework in [19], we make a generator to
translate a photorealistic image to a segmentation mask,
and the work [21] is used to train another generator that
converts the resultant segmentation mask to a photorelistic
image.
3) SLAM: To verify that our anonymization method has
no effect on vision-based robot perception, we utilize si-
multaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) techniques.
By using SLAM, in an unknown environment, a robot
constructs a map around itself and localizes itself in the
resultant map. Hence, in a video frame, manipulation of
some pixels could affect the performance of SLAM since
a map is drawn by extracting feature points of lines, edges,
and corners of objects in images. In this work, ORB-
SLAM2 [22] is implemented on our system, which is one
of the most popular algorithms of the vision-based SLAM.
II. PRIVACY-PROTECTION DRONE PATROL SYSTEM
This section introduces our face anonymizing drone
patrol system in Fig. 1, which consists of a ground station
and a video-recording drone.
Ground Station: this component has two tasks: (1)
command and (2) viewer. The ground station is connected
to the video-recording drone via Wi-Fi, one of the wireless
technologies. This part is running a command program,
and then controls location of the drone. Via the program,
we can order the drone to move toward a specific point.
In addition, through wireless communication, this ground
station receives resultant video frames from the drone, and
then presents those frames via our viewer.
Video-Recording Drone: The drone consists of a high-
resolution camera, a companion computer, and a motor
control computer, where the camera and the motor con-
trol computer are connected to the companion computer.
The companion computer fetches video frames from the
camera, and then anonymizes faces in the received frames
by executing our face-anonymizing networks. The ORB-
SLAM2 is additionally processed in the resultant videos.
The final results are transmitted to the ground station.
In addition, the companion computer receives a moving
command, and passes on it to the motor control computer.
The key features of our system are summarized as
follows.
3Fig. 1. Composition of the developed patrol robot system with privacy preserving face detection.
• In our face-anonymizing system, deep-learning net-
works anonymize all detected faces never to be dis-
tinguishable for protecting the person’s privacy. To
obtain networks for our system purpose, our training
architecture consists of two state-of-the-art GANs,
called CycleGAN and GauGAN. Moreover, we mod-
ify the generator’s and discriminator’s loss of both
GANs.
• In our system, the anonymization process is performed
on a companion computer in a drone, which fetches
video frames directly from a high-resolution camera.
Hence, the transmitted video frames have no privacy-
sensitive information, and thus a person’s privacy can
be completely protected.
• By implementing ORB-SLAM2 in our system, we
verify that our anonymization scheme requires no
sacrifice on the performance of vision-based SLAM.
By anonymizing faces, our system effectively protects
the person’s privacy while preserving performance of
the robot perception.
III. APPROACH, MODIFICATIONS, AND ALGORITHM
In this section, we introduce our approach for anonymiz-
ing faces via neural-type networks and a training architec-
ture to train those networks. For our training architecture,
we present how to combine two up-to-date GANs, and then
We describe our modifications on losses for our purpose.
In addition, we explain the training procedure and how to
make our training dataset. Finally, we present and explain
our face-anonymizing algorithm.
A. Face Anonymizing Approach
Fig. 2 illustrates our anonymization approach for our
system. To anonymize faces, a companion computer has
three different networks: Face detection network, Segmen-
tation network, and Synthesis network. The face detection
network operates to detect faces whenever a video frame
is fetched to the companion computer. Detected faces are
cropped and resized to meet the required input size of
the segmentation network. Via the segmentation network,
face’s images are translated to semantic images. Note that
the semantic images have no privacy information but the
outline of detected faces is still maintained in the resultant
images. The synthesis network generates photorelistic im-
ages based on the semantic images. Finally, the phtorelistic
images replace the original faces. Since semantic images
still have the outline of each facial component, phtorelistic
images could retain facial expressions.
B. Training Architecture for Segmentation and Synthesis
Networks
Fig. 3 presents our training architecture for segmenta-
tion and synthesis networks. To train those networks, we
combine CycleGAN and GauGAN each of which is one of
the spotlight image-to-image translation frameworks using
GAN. The segmentation network is trained by CycleGAN’s
framework, where Generator G called segmentation gener-
ator is to generate a semantic images from a photorealistic
image. The synthesis network is obtained from GauGAN’s
framework. Generator Gs will make a photorealistic image
from the output of segmentation generator G.
To obtain well-trained networks suitable for anonymiza-
tion, we make modifications to generators’ and discrimi-
nators’ losses of both translation frameworks.
1) Training Architecture Model: To explain our modifi-
cations, we formulate our training architecture as follows.
For training samples, X and Y denote a photorelistic
domain and a semantic domain, respectively. For each
domain, training samples are represented by {xi}
N
i=1 and
{yj}
N
j=1.
1 Samples of each domain are followed by a
data distribution, which represents x ∼ pdata(x) and y ∼
pdata(y), respectively. In this architecture, we have three
generators, G, F , and Gs. Each generator is a mapping
function: G : X → Y , F : Y → X , and Gs : Y → X .
For adversarial networks of those generators, there are dis-
criminators DX , DY , and D
s
X each of which distinguishes
1In this work, xi is paired with a corresponding yj , and thus both
domains have the same number of samples.
4Fig. 2. Our Approach to Anonymize Faces in a Video Frame
Fig. 3. Training Architecture for Segmentation and Synthesis Networks
if a input is from a data distribution or is generated by a
generator. DY , DX , and D
s
X examine output of G, F , and
Gs, respectively.
2) Well-Known Basic Definitions: In this subsection,
we introduce well-known definitions of losses [19], [21].
Based on the losses, we will describe our modifications.
Adversarial Loss: for each generator and discriminator
pair, the adversarial loss is defined as follows.
Ladv(G,DY , X, Y ) = Ex∼pdata(x)[log(1−DY (G(x)))]
+ Ey∼pdata(y)[log(DY (y))], (1)
where G(x) is a generated image by a generator G. G tries
to makeDY as difficult as possible to distinguish generated
samples G(x) from real samples y whereas DY should
not be deceived by G. The relationship can be formulated
as minGmaxDY Ladv(G,DY , X, Y ). Hence, the generator
actually should minimize the following loss.
Ladv,G(G,DY , X, Y ) = Ex∼pdata(x)[log(1−DY (G(x)))].
(2)
For other pairs, (F ,DX ) and (G
s, DsX), the adversarial loss
can be obtained by replacing (G, DY ) in (1) with (F , DX )
and (Gs, DsX ). In addition, in (1), X and Y are replaced
with Y and X .
Cycle-Consistency Loss: the cycle-consistency loss [19]
is defined as
Lcyc(G,F ) = Lcyc,G(F ) + Lcyc,F (G), (3)
where LG,cyc(F ) and LF,cyc(G) is a cycle-consistency loss
for each generator, which is defined as
Lcyc,G(F ) = Ex∼pdata(x)[‖F (G(x)) − x‖1], (4)
Lcyc,F (G) = Ey∼pdata(y)[‖G(F (y)) − y‖1]. (5)
This cycle-consistency loss is used to induce a sample xi to
be mapped to a desired sample yj . Note that the adversarial
loss guarantees that via a learned mapping function samples
in a domain X are mapped to samples in a domain Y , but
the learned mapping function cannot translate a sample xi
to a intended yj . In other words, the adversarial loss can
guarantee translation between data distributions. Hence, to
obtain a mapping function between individual samples,
the cycle-consistency loss should be used in the training
procedure for generators.
Multi-Scale Discriminators’ Feature Loss: multiple
discriminators are utilized to distinguish between a sample
yj and a synthesized output G(xi) [21]. M Discriminators
are trained to distinguish yj and G(xi) at M different
scales, which allows each discriminator to examine yj and
G(xi) at a different view. As the size of yj and G(xi)
becomes smaller, a discriminator has a wider view of yj
and G(xi) since receptive field sizes of all the discrimina-
tors are the same. By using multiple discriminators, for a
generator Gs, a GAN feature matching loss is defined as
follows.
LFM,Gs(D
s
X,1, . . . , D
s
X,M )
=
M∑
k=1
1
M
E(y,x)
[ T∑
i=1
1
Ni
‖Ds,iX,k(x)−D
s,i
X,k(G
s(y))‖1
]
, (6)
where E(y,x)∼pdata(y,x) , E(y,x) for simplicity. M is the
number of discriminators, DsX,k(·) is the M -th discrimina-
tor, and D
s,i
X,k is denoted as the i-th layer feature extractor
ofDsX,k(·). Ni means the number of elements in each layer,
and T is the number of feature layers. Note that Gs can
learn how to translate a semantic image to a photorealistic
image at both coarse and fine views since discriminators
distinguish x and Gs(y) at M different views.
VGG Perceptual Loss: the work [21] utilizes the per-
ceptual loss in [23]. The VGG perceptual loss is obtained
by the 19-layer VGG network [24]. The VGG perceptual
loss is defined as
LVGG(ψ, x,G
s(y)) =
∑
i∈SI
‖ψi(G
s(y))− ψi(x)‖1
CiHiWi
, (7)
5where SI is the set including VGG’s layer indexes, ψ is
the 19-layer VGG network and ψi is denoted as the i-th
layer of ψ. For ψi, Ci, Hi, and Wi are the number of
channels, the height, and the width, respectively. By min-
imizing LVGG(·), G
s can generate a photorealistic image
Gs(y), visually indistinguishable from x in the feature-level
perspective.
C. Our Modifications for Anonymization System
1) Modification on Segmentation Generator’s Loss: The
goal of a segmentation generator G is to generate semantic
images with which a synthesis generator Gs makes well-
synthesized images.
Modification: to consider the performance of Gs in the
loss of G, we define the loss of G as follows.
LG(G,F,DY , G
s)
= Ladv, G(G,DY , X, Y ) + λcycLcyc,G(F )︸ ︷︷ ︸
the original loss of G
+ λsLGs(G
s, DsX,1, . . . , D
s
X,M , G) + λdistLdist(G)︸ ︷︷ ︸
the newly added term
, (8)
where Ldist(G) = Ex∼pdata(x)[‖G(x) − y‖1], and Ldist(G)
could further reduce the space of possible mapping func-
tions with Lcyc,G(F ). LGs is the loss of a synthesis
generator Gs, and will be explained in Section III-C2 in
detail. In addition, λcyc, λs, and λdist control the relative
importance of each loss.
By adding LGs(G
s, DsX,1, . . . , D
s
X,M , G), the generator
G will be trained to generate a semantic image minimizing
the loss of Gs.
Objective of Segmentation Learning Part: Hence, the
full objective of segmentation-learning part is defined as:
Lseg(G,F,DX , DY , G
s)
= LG(G,F,DY , G
s) + Ey∼pdata(y)[DY (y)]
+ LF (G,F,DX) + Ex∼pdata(x)[DX(x)], (9)
where LF (G,F,DX)=Ladv,F (F,DX ,Y,X)+λcycLcyc,F (G).
The segmentation learning part will solve (9) as follows:
G∗, F ∗ = argmin
G,F
max
DX ,DY
Lseg(G,F,DX , DY , G
s). (10)
2) Modifications on Synthesis Generator’s Loss: There
are two main challenges to hinder the learning of synthesis
generator to anonymize faces. We introduce loss of a
synthesis generatorGs, and then explain each challenge. To
obtain a synthesis generator to achieve our system purpose,
we have a modification on the loss of Gs and the loss
of DsX,k, ∀k. In addition, we modify the way to train the
discriminator DsX,k.
In [21], by using (2), (6), and (7), the loss of a synthesis
generator can be written as
LGs(G
s, DsX,1, . . .D
s
X,M , G)
=
M∑
k=1
1
M
{
Ladv,Gs(G
s, DsX,k, Y,X,G(x)) + LFM,Gs(D
s
X,k)
}
+ LVGG(ψ, x,G
s(G(x))), (11)
where we introduce for simplicity LFM,Gs(D
s
X,k) =
E(y,x)
[∑T
i=1
1
Ni
‖Ds,iX,k(x) − D
s,i
X,k(G
s(y))‖1
]
in (6). In
addition, Ladv,Gs(G
s, DsX,k, Y,X,G(x)) is redefined as
Ladv,Gs(G
s, DsX,k, Y,X,G(x))
= Eyˆ∼pdata(y)
[
log(1−DsX,k(G
s(yˆ)))
]
, (12)
where yˆ = G(x).
Challenge in VGG Perceptual Loss: in the synthesis-
learning part, the loss (11) should be minimized to
train the generator Gs. The minimization leads to re-
duce LVGG(ψ, x,G
s(G(x))), and thus the distance between
features of x and Gs(G(x)) is also reduced during the
training of Gs. As a result, the generator Gs is trained
to generate a photorealistic image Gs(G(x)) that can be
almost the same as the original photorealistic image x.
This trained generator cannot be utilized for our face-
anonymizing system.
Modification on VGG Perceptual Loss: to prevent the
distance between Gs(G(x)) and x from being reduced to
a very small value, we introduce margins to the VGG
perceptual loss (7) as follows.
LVGG(ψ, x,G
s(y), SI)
=
∑
i∈SI
max
(
0,
‖ψi(G
s(y))− ψi(x)‖1
CiHiWi
− ǫm(i)
)
, (13)
where Υ = {ǫ1, . . . , ǫ|SI|} and |SI| is the number of
elements in SI. m(i) is a mapping function to find for
SI a VGG’s layer index corresponding to i.
Note that a margin value allows the distance between the
i-th VGG layers for x and Gs(G(x)) to be at least ǫi value.
Hence, a photorealistic image Gs(G(x)) can have different
features from features of the original image x, which could
make Gs(G(x)) look different from x.
Challenge in Adversarial Loss and Multi-Scale Dis-
criminators’ Feature Loss: to explain our additional mod-
ifications, we need to comprehend about how a discrimina-
tor DsX,k works. Based on the understanding, we describe
a hindrance to the learning of our synthesis generator Gs.
In addition, we modify the adversarial losses of Gs and
DsX,k, and the multi-scale discriminators’ feature loss of
Gs.
To minimize (12), Gs should make a synthesized face
Gs(G(x)) look like a face in the training dataset, and
thus tends to translate G(x) to x that is what our system
should anonymize. Specifically, in (12), a discriminator
DsX,k examines G
s(G(x)) to determine if Gs(G(x)) is
from the training dataset X or is arbitrarily generated.
The generated image Gs(G(x)) contains an entire face,
and thus DsX,k is trained to determine whether the entire
face in Gs(G(x)) is from the training dataset. As a result,
to deceive DsX,k, G
s is trained to generate x from G(x).
Modifications on Adversarial Loss and Multi-Scale
Discriminators’ Feature Loss: to prevent that Gs regen-
erates the almost same face as x, we have modification on
the adversarial losses of Gs and DsX,k. The reason that G
s
reproduces x is because a discriminator DsX,k examines
if the entire face in Gs(G(x)) is from a training dataset
including x. In other words, to deceive DsX,k checking an
entire face, Gs necessarily makes a face from the domain
6X , which greatly reduces the space of possible mapping.
In addition, Gs should produce a photorealistic face by
maintaining the shape and location of each facial part in a
semantic-face image, which also further reduces the space
of possible mapping.
For expanding the space of possible mapping, we limit
a discriminator DsX,k to investigate each facial component,
not entire face. By applying the idea, the adversarial loss
is rewritten as follows.
Lsadv(G
s, DsX,1, . . . , D
s
X,M , Y,X, Sξ)
=
M∑
k=1
1
M
{
Ey∼pdata(y)
[∑
i∈Sξ
1
|Sξ|
log(1−DsX,k(ξi(G
s(yˆ))))
]}
+
M∑
k=1
1
M
{
Ex∼pdata(x)
[∑
i∈Sξ
1
|Sξ|
log(DsX,k(ξi(x)))
]}
,
(14)
where we denote the output of our segmentation gener-
ator as yˆ = G(x), ξi is the extractor to extract pixels
corresponding to the label index i, Sξ is the set including
extracted labels’ index, and |Sξ| is the number of elements
in Sξ. For example, if i = 2 and the label index 2 indicates
a nose in a face, all pixels in ξ2(G
s(yˆ)) become zero except
for the pixels corresponding to the nose.
According to (14), our modification allows a discrimina-
torDsX,k to examine a part of a face instead of observing all
facial parts at a time. This approach allows discriminators
to learn the distribution of each facial component instead
of learning the distribution of an entire face. Hence, a
discriminator tries to distinguish each part of a face in
Gs(yˆ) from that of a face in x, which could widen the
space of possible mapping in the entire face’s point of
view. In addition, by setting |Sξ| < Nf where Nf denotes
the number of labels in a face, we make discriminators
observe some parts of an entire face, and thus the generator
Gs could have wider space of possible mapping for the
other parts not examined by discriminators.
In the same vein, the multi-scale discriminators’ feature
loss can be also redefined as (15).
In spite of our modifications on Lsadv(·) and LFM,Gs(·),
there is still room for Gs to learn to regenerate x since
LFM,Gs(D
s
X,k, Sξ) still compares features of G
s(G(x)) and
x, which are extracted by DsX,k. Hence, we slightly modify
(15) to (16). In (16), E(x,y,x˜)∼pdata(x,y,x) , Ex,y,x˜, and
x˜ 6= x but x˜ is from the same training dataset of x. By
the modification, LFM,Gs(D
s
X,k, Sξ) compares features of
Gs(G(x)) to features of x˜, which can help Gs learning to
generate a different face from x.
Objective of Synthesis Learning Part: Based on (13),
(14), and (16), our full objective of synthesis-learning part
is defined as:
Lsyn(G
s, DsX,1, . . . , D
s
X,M , Sξ, G)
= Lsadv(G
s, DsX,1, . . . , D
s
X,M , Y,X, Sξ)
+ LFM,Gs(D
s
X,1, . . . , D
s
X,M , Sξ)
+ LVGG(ψ, x,G
s(y), SI) + Lcyc,Gs(G), (17)
where Lcyc,Gs(G) = Ex∼pdata(x)[‖G(G
s(G(x))) −G(x)‖1]
that allows a synthesized image Gs(G(x)) to maintain the
shape and location of each facial part in x. Since (16)
Algorithm 1 Training Procedure for One Epoch
Output: Generators, G∗ and (Gs)∗
for i = 1 : Ndata
1) Select x, y, x˜ from the dataset X and Y
2) Update G, F , DX , DY with G
s
(9): argmin
G,F
max
DX ,DY
Lseg(G,F,DX , DY , G
s)
3) Update Gs, DsX,k, ∀k with G, F , DX , DY
(17): argmin
Gs
max
Ds
X,k
,∀k
Lsyn(G
s, DsX,1, . . . , D
s
X,M , Sξ, G)
compares features of Gs(G(x)) to those of x˜, the generator
Gs can make a synthesized image to remain the shape
and location of each facial part in x˜ not in x. Hence,
Lcyc,Gs(G) helps G
s to generate synthesized images to
remain the shape and location of facial parts in x. Hence,
by Lcyc,Gs(G) and (16), G
s can generate a synthesized face
Gs(G(x)) including facial features of x˜ while maintaining
the shape and location of facial components in x.
Finally, the synthesis learning part will solve (17) as
follows:
(Gs)∗ = argmin
Gs
max
Ds
X,k
,∀k
Lsyn(G
s, DsX,1, . . . , D
s
X,M , Sξ, G).
(18)
D. Training Procedure and Details
Procedure: The overall training procedure is summa-
rized in Algorithm 1, where Ndata is the number of data in
the dataset X and Y . By repeating the training procedure,
we obtain the optimized G∗ and (Gs)∗.
Details: In segmentation learning part, for the segmen-
tation generator G, we adopt the network architecture in
[23] that is known for powerful neural-type transfer and
use 9 resnet blocks for 256×256 images, which is applied
equally to the generator F . For the discriminators DX
and DY , we use 70 × 70 PatchGANs [14], [19], [25],
[26]. In synthesis learning part, we construct our network
architecture by applying the Spectrum Norm [27] to all
the layers in both generator and discriminator. For our
synthesis generator, we use the SPADE generator in [21].
Finally, we set M = 3 for our discriminators.
For our training, we set λcyc, λs, λdist to 10 in (8). A
solver is set to the ADAM solver [28] with a batch size of
1. For the solver, β1 = 0.5 and β2 = 0.999 in segmentation
learning part and β1 = 0 and β2 = 0.999 in synthesis
learning part.
Training Dataset: We conduct our training procedure
with CelebA-HQ dataset [29]. This dataset contains 30,000
high-resolution face images with 19 semantic classes. In
this work, we modify the semantic dataset by extracting 10
main facial components. In our modified semantic dataset,
semantic classes include skin, nose, eyes, eyebrows, ears,
mouth, lip, hair, neck, and eyeglass. In addition, we utilize a
face detector to crop a face in high-resolution face images.
The reason that cropped face images are needed is that in
our system faces in a video frame will be detected by using
a face detector. By conducting this preprocessing, we can
train segmentation and synthesis generators, optimized for
our system.
Moreover, we create and use various resolution images
for a image. Our segmentation generator requires a specific
7LFM,Gs(D
s
X,1, . . . , D
s
X,M , Sξ) =
M∑
k=1
1
M
E(y,x)
[ T∑
i=1
1
Ni
∑
j∈Sξ
1
|Sξ|
‖Ds,iX,k(ξj(x))D
s,i
X,k(ξj(G
s(yˆ)))‖1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LFM,Gs (D
s
X,k
,Sξ)
. (15)
LFM,Gs(D
s
X,1, . . . , D
s
X,M , Sξ) =
M∑
k=1
1
M
E(y,x,x˜)
[ T∑
i=1
1
Ni
∑
j∈Sξ
1
|Sξ|
‖Ds,iX,k(ξj(x˜))−D
s,i
X,k(ξj(G
s(yˆ)))‖1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LFM,Gs (D
s
X,k
,Sξ)
, (16)
Algorithm 2 Face-Anonymizing Algorithm
Input: Face detector D; Segmentation generator G;
Synthesis generator Gs; Video frame v
Output: Anonymized video frame v˜
1) D(v) → fD, Nface, Rthr // Face detection in v
2) while ratio < Rthr do // Detect tightly a face in fD
D(fD)→ fD, Rthr
3) if Nface > 0 then // Faces exist
- Gs(G(fD))→ fA // Anonymization of faces
- fA ∗B
−1(G(fD))
+fD ∗B(G(fD)) → fA · · · 1©
- (v − fD) + fA → v˜ // Faces’ replacement
else // No faces to anonymize
v → v˜
4) Terminate face anonymization in a video frame
sized image as input, and thus detected face images should
be resized to the specific size. If the size of a detected face
is smaller than the required size, a resized face image is low
resolution. In reality, our system can detect a face in various
sizes, various resolutions. To make our segmentation and
synthesis generators work well with various resolutions, we
utilize various resolution images for a face image during
our training procedure.
E. Face-Anonymizing Algorithm
With the optimized segmentation and synthesis gener-
ators, our face-anonymizing procedure is conducted as in
Algorithm 2. A companion computer conducts Algorithm 2
whenever it receives a video frame. fD denotes detected
faces, Nface is the number of detected faces, fA includes
all anonymized faces, and Rthr is a threshold for the ratio
of the face size to the image size. Note that fD and fA also
include the background as well as faces.
Maintenance of Background: In Algorithm 2, B(·)
is a function that makes all nonzero elements in a input
semantic image 1. In a semantic image, zero indicates the
background. B−1(·) is the opposite function of B(·).
Hence, in Algorithm 2, 1© creates a image that mixes the
anonymized face in fA and the background in fD, which
could preserve the background in the original image.
Repetitive Face Detection: In Algorithm 2, we repeat to
conduct the face detector with detected faces until the size
of a face in fD occupies Rthr × 100 of the size of fD. The
reason for this repetitive detection is that our generators
well anonymize a input image that is full of one face. The
Fig. 4. Bounding box regression and NMS
face detector finds a face with the bounding box regression
and non-maximum suppression (NMS). The bounding box
regression provides several bounding boxes (red boxes) on
a face in Fig. 4(a). Then, NMS trims the bounding boxes
to obtain a bounding box (the yellow box) in Fig. 4(b). In
Fig. 4(c), however, the resultant image is not suitable as
input for our generators. Hence, to increase the ratio of the
face size to the image size, we repeatedly conduct the face
detector on a face until we obtain a image in Fig. 4(d).
F. Drone Patrol System
The drone system consists of the following components:
(1) Drone control computer operating motors so that the
drone can move physically, (2) Companion computer con-
ducting face-anonymizing neural networks and performing
SLAM, (3) Wireless chipset receiving commands from the
ground station and transmitting anonymized video frames
to it, (4) High-resolution camera recording a video;
In our drone, the companion computer is connected with
the drone control computer, the wireless chipset, and the
high-resolution camera. We utilize ROS to allow all the
components to communicate with each other. Via wireless
communication, the companion computer communicates
with the ground station. The ground station can transmit
a command message to the companion computer. The
companion computer sends the received message to drone
control computer controls. The moving drone continuously
records images via the camera, which is passed to our
face-anonymzing networks implemented in the companion
computer. The anonymized images are sent back to the
ground station via the wireless chipset, and thus we can
immediately check the results on the screen of the ground
station. At the same time, the anonymized images are
processed by the ORB-SLAM2 algorithm.
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Fig. 6. Test Results on Helen Dataset
IV. EVALUATION
A. Face-Anonymizing Generators Evaluation
Face Detection: Our system utilizes a lightweight but
accurate face detector, called FaceBoxes [30]. The com-
puting speed is invariant no matter how many faces are in
a image, and the accuracy was verified with various face
datasets.
Test Dataset: We test our face-anonymizing generators
on several datasets.
• CelebA-HQ: This dataset contains 30,000 high-
resolution face images. We randomly select 1,500
images for our test. Note that the remaining 28,500
images are used for the training.
• Helen: This dataset has 2,330 face images [31]. In
addition, this provides 2,330 annotation images to
locate 8 facial components, which are skin, eyebrow,
eye, nose, lip, inner mouth, and hair.
• Facescrub: This dataset is large face datset, which
contains 106,863 face images of male and female 530
celebrities [32].
• FaceForensic: This dataset provides 1000 video se-
quences, which has been sourced from 977 youtube
videos [33]. All videos contain a mostly frontal face
without occlusions.
Qualitative Evaluation of Face Anonymization:
Figs. 5, 6, and 7 provide the quality of our face-
anonymizing generators. We can confirm that our method
produces well anonymized faces for diverse faces in
CelebA-HQ, Helen, and FaceScrub dataset. For each
dataset, the additional results are shown in Figs. 14, 15,
and 16.
Quantitative Evaluation of Face Anonymization: To
evaluate our anonymization system quantitatively, we uti-
lize siamese network [34]. The siamese network is widely
Fig. 7. Test Results on FaceScrub Dataset
TABLE I
AVERAGE EUCLIDEAN DISTANCE FOR EACH TEST DATASET
Criterion Test Dataset
Average
Euclidean
Distance
Same Different CelebA
HQ
Helen FaceScrub
person people
1.15 2.13 1.57 2.59 1.94
utilized to measure the dissimilarity between two images.
Via the siamese network, we measure how dissimilar an
anonymized face and an original face are.
For our evaluation, we train a siamese network to cal-
culate Euclidean distance between two faces. The larger
the euclidean distance is, the more dissimilar two faces
are. The inception resnet [35] is adopted for the backbone
network of the siamese network. We perform 50 epochs
of training on the CASIA-WebFace dataset [36], which
includes about 500,000 images, and the image sizes are
256× 256.
Table I presents the average Euclidean distance for
each test dataset. In the criterion, the value for ’Same
person’ is average Euclidean distance between faces of the
same person, and another value for ’Different people’ is
obtained between faces of different people. Those values
are measured during training the siamese network. For each
test dataset, the value is the average Euclidean distance
between an original face and an anonymized face by our
system. Note that the larger the value is, the more dissimilar
two faces are.
According to Table I, our anonymization system indeed
can make a face that looks different from an original face.
For all test dataset, the average Euclidean distance is larger
than that of criterion.
B. Evaluation of Algorithm 2
To test Algorithm 2, we conduct our algorithm on Face-
Forensic video dataset. Fig. 8 presents results for various
videos. In each result for ’original’ and ’Anonymized’,
a enlarged face image is attached for readability. Those
results confirm that our algorithm finds a face in a video
frame, and then anonymizes the detected face well. The
additional results are shown in Figs. 12 and 13.
As a result, for various dataset, our privacy-protection
drone vision system can remove privacy information of a
person by anonymizing his/her face.
C. SLAM Results
In this section, we investigate the impact of our proposal
on vision-based robot perception, ORB-SLAM2. Fig. 9
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shows two types of results:
• Frames with SLAM’s features are obtained via ORB-
SLAM2, in the upper figures of Fig. 9. The resultant
images include green boxes that are feature points ex-
tracted by ORB-SLAM2. The feature points indicate
edges, lines, and corners of objects in a image.
• PointCloud2’s results are drawn via RVIZ [37], [38]
based on the extracted feature points. In the lower
figures of Fig. 9, the white points are stamped by
the calculated distance between a ZED camera and
extracted feature points.
In Fig. 9, the upper figures present the comparison of
feature extraction results on a original video frame and
an anonymized video frame. In both frames, the feature
points are well extracted. The extracted feature points of
our anonymization scheme are almost the same as that of
the original video. In addition, we can notice that the face
is also anonymized well by our scheme.
The lower figures present the distance between a camera
and a face, measured by ORB-SLAM2. In the red circle,
the white points are extracted from the face. Hence, the
distance between those points and a ZED camera means
the distance between the face and the camera. Under our
scheme, the distance is almost the same as that under the
original video.
In summary, our anonymization scheme has no impact
on the performance of ORB-SLAM2, which confirms that
our system can preserve vision-based drone perception
well. In the drone perception, inaccuracy can indeed incur
an accident where a drone hits a person’s face. Since
our approach effectively protects the person’s privacy with
good perception, our anonymization scheme is certainly
proper to privacy-protection drone patrol system.
D. Drone Hardware Setup
Drone Hardware Specification: We build a customized
drone each component of which is as follows. We selected
DJI F550 for our drone frame. 1137 T-motor V2 carbon
fiber propeller and T-motor MN3110 KV 780 are selected
as propellers and motors. T-motor Air 40A is chosen as
electronic speed controllers. We utilize Holybro Pixhawk4
for our drone control computer. Finally, we selected ZED
stereo camera for our high-resolution camera.
Experiments of Face-Anonymizing Networks with
Nvidia Xavier: NVIDIA Jetson Xavier is an machine-
learning computer for autonomous machines with the high-
computing power. Especially, this companion computer has
a 512-core GPU, and thus it is indeed suitable for large-
scale matrix operations which are needed for efficient neu-
ral networks computation. A 8800mah 4S1P LiPo battery
was installed for power supply, which provides a voltage
of 14.8V.
E. Our Face-Anonymizing System Result on Drone
Fig. 10 shows our face-anonymizing system results on
a video recorded in a drone. The drone is hovering in our
laboratory, and a person is walking in front of the drone.
From this result, we can confirm that our system can well
anonymize a face with varying its size.
Fig. 11 presents the comparison of feature extraction
results on an original video and an anonymized video. Both
videos confirm that the feature points are well extracted.
In our anonymization scheme, the extracted feature points
are almost the same as that of the original video.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a privacy-protection drone
patrol system with face-anonymizing deep-learning net-
works. To train face-anonymizing networks, we proposed
a training architecture, which consists of the segmentation
learning part and the synthesis learning part. The training
architecture is constructed by combining CycleGAN and
GauGAN. We additionally modified generators’ losses of
those GANs for our purpose. In our system, our face-
anonymizing networks transform all original faces in every
snapshot to different faces. Hence, in snapshots, privacy of
people can be fundamentally protected. Via various test
dataset, we confirmed that our system can indeed preserve
the person’s privacy qualitatively and quantitatively. In
addition, by implementing ORB-SLAM2, we also verified
that our system can preserve the vision-based perception of
drone with well-anonymized faces. Finally, our system was
also evaluated with actually recorded videos on drone.
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